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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the feasibility of the civilianization plan 
of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in the Republic of Korea (ROK). MND 
developed a plan to construct modernized military power and to operate it efficiently and 
effectively. MND promotes the plan to increase civilian personnel ratio inside the 
Headquarters by 2009, which is relatively faster than other main policies. Moreover, the 
environment inside and outside the organization is not mature enough to drive this policy 
quickly. There are also widely differing points of view on this policy between military 
members and civilian personnel. Defense ministries in other countries, especially the 
United States, have well-developed systems to educate and recruit civilian experts. By 
doing so, they attained a high level of civilian participation while minimizing possible 
problems. Many people in the organization worry about this plan because there are not 
enough organizations and systems to educate and train civilian defense experts. Although 
the direct comparison of workforce capability between military members and civilian 
personnel is limited, there are advantages and disadvantages that can be obtained through 
civilianization.  Therefore, it is necessary to change this policy to a long-term one with 
more elaborate procedures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
In September 2005, The Ministry of National Defense in the Republic of Korea 
announced Defense Reform Plan 2020, which is a comprehensive and long-term plan for 
the 2005-2020 period. The Defense Minister said that the plan focuses on developing the 
country’s manpower-intensive force into a “smaller but stronger” one suitable for the 
warfare of the future. The plan addresses four main policies: downsizing and 
reorganizing force structure, increasing the civilian workforce ratio in the Defense 
Ministry, strengthening the system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and securing defense 
budgets to support the defense reform. However, contrary to other initiatives that are 
making steady progress, the civilianization of the Defense Ministry is coming under close 
scrutiny. This is due to the Defense Ministry imposing a time limit to increase the civilian 
ratio in the organization by 2009.  
The civil reform plan’s general idea is that the future manpower structure has a 
well-balanced civilian workforce and enough military personnel to effectively and 
efficiently implement the defense policies. Unlike other developed countries, the civilian 
workforce ratio in the South Korean Defense Ministry is relatively low, and is currently 
at 62%. In 2007, the Defense Ministry requested the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses 
(KIDA) to survey people’s attitudes about what needs to be improved about this policy 
inside and outside the ministry. The results from this survey differ depending on the 
participant’s occupation and origin. Moreover, the newly appointed Defense Minister 
directed the Defense Ministry to review the policy of filling 70% of ministry posts with 
civilians (“Defense Chief orders ‘about face’”, 2008). The policy of increasing the 
civilian workforce ratio in the Ministry of National Defense headquarters became 
deadlocked and is increasingly drawing public attention. 
The United States Department of Defense performed a qualitative and quantitative 
analyses to figure out the best human resources plan for the organization. A variety of 
institutes published related papers and literature and the DoD has tried to reflect those 
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opinions and results actively. By doing so, the military as a professional entity for 
national security becomes well harmonized with civilian control. In light of this, it is 
worthwhile for the Defense Ministry to consider what it is not focusing on and to view 
the DoD’s approach for achieving civilian control.  
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of the study is to examine the feasibility of the plan to increase the 
civilian workforce ratio in the Ministry of National Defense. The most important thing to 
be considered is not the ratio itself, but the improvement of experience and expertise 
throughout this plan.  
1. Primary Research Questions 
• How would the civilianization of military positions support the 
Defense Ministry’s reform objectives? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What factors are considered in the examination of converting military 
jobs to civilian ones? 
• How does the civilianization process differ between of the Republic of 
Korea Ministry of National Defense (ROK MND) and the United 
States Department of Defense (US DoD)? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The positions under examination in this research are the positions within the 
Defense Ministry Headquarters, which consists of 16 directors and 57 sectional chiefs, as 
well as 652 working-level positions. The reason behind this is the fact that most Koreans 
recognize the conversion from military positions to civilian ones in the Ministry 
Headquarters as the process of civilianization cited in the defense reform. 
Chapter II presents the background and main policies’ objectives supporting 
South Korea’s plan for defense reform. Chapter III focuses on civilian defense reform in 
 3
South Korea and shows the United States case for civilian control over the defense 
system. Consideration of economic aspects will be explained in Chapter IV. Economic 
analysis will be focused on the cost differences between uniformed personnel and civilian 
workforce. Finally, Chapter V presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The study primarily consists of a qualitative organizational policy analysis. 
Reports from the Defense Ministry and survey results from the Korea Institute for 
Defense Analyses were analyzed. The methodology used in this study consists of the 
following steps: 
1. Review South Korea’s defense reform plan 
2. Focus on the civilian portion of the reform plan 
3. Review Korea Institute of Defense Analyses survey results 
4. Review the U.S. literature about civilian defense reform and cost comparisons 
between uniformed personnel and civilian workforce 
5. Research benefits from the civilian defense reform 
6. Analyze costs and benefits 
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II. ROK DEFENSE REFORM 2020 
A. BACKGROUND 
Defense Reform Plan 2020 began from the government’s security policy plan and 
understanding of defense reform. In December 2004, former President Roh Moo Hyun 
said, “France legislates for its defense reform plan, and it is critical for consistent defense 
reform to make a foundation by law. The key point of the plan is to convert the current 
manpower-based military structure into a technology-intensive one, and the military 
should develop the defense reform’s long-term goals and visions clearly by its own 
initiative” (Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, 2008, p. 21-22). In June 2005, 
the Ministry of National Defense organized a taskforce and proposed the defense reform 
draft to the National Assembly.  
There have been several attempts to reform the defense system in South Korea 
since the early 1970s. At the end of 1971, U.S. forces in Korea had been cut by 20,000, 
which caused fear that there would be a gap in the nation’s security (Sung-Joo Han, 1980, 
p. 1078-1080). Then President Park Chung Hee proposed a self-reliant defense in order to 
build South Korea’s own defense industrial base to fill this gap. This first defense reform 
achieved remarkable success thanks to President Park’s strong determination and 
considerable financial support (Yong-sup Han, 2006, p. 113-114). After that, following 
administrations also tried to implement defense reform, but they failed to accomplish the 
goal due to political and economic problems. In the case of Defense Reform 2020, 
however, the Defense Ministry has been receiving strong support from the President and 
little resistance from the opposition parties, as they were a minority. 
As acquisition for defense is becoming more difficult, a flexible defense 
management system and performance-focused management are necessary to 
accommodate rapid societal change and development. Defense reform, with the 
governments’ strong support, is prevailing worldwide in countries such as the United 
States and Russia, as well as in Korea’s neighbors China and Japan. Many countries with 
strong militaries are modernizing their weapon systems with highly developed 
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technologies, and reducing and integrating troops and units. After analyzing other 
countries’ examples of defense reform and evaluating the current status of its military, the 
South Korean government and Defense Ministry concluded that they needed to carry out 
reform in order to solve increasing problems in the military. 
B. CURRENT PROBLEMS 
South Korea traditionally has maintained a manpower-intensive military structure 
in preparation against North Korea’s massive conventional forces. As Table 1 shows, 
North Korea’s military consists of more than 1 million troops, of which about 90% are 
army. South Korea had no choice but to maintain a similar ratio of its troops to cope with 
viable threats. However, current development of information and technology makes the 
arena of modern warfare bigger, more precise and network-oriented. There is an urgent 
need for South Korea’s military to change its military structure to correspond with the 
new warfare phase, which is structured around elite and streamlined forces and the 
balanced development of all services. 
 
Table 1.   Comparison of Military Capabilities between ROK and DPRK (After: Ministry of 
National Defense, 2006) 
Classification ROK DPRK 
Total More than 674,000 More than 1,170,000 
Army 541,000 1,000,000 




Air Force 65,000 110,000 
Reserve Forces (troops) 3,040,000 
7,700,000 
(including instruction guidance units, 
Worker/Peasant red guard units, and 
Red youth guard) 
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Given the current manpower-intensive military structure in South Korea, 
investment for the build-up of military capabilities is insufficient. In consequence, the 
essential equipment for modern warfare (e.g., long-range precision strike capability, 
intelligence assets and surveillance equipment) is insufficient.  As the demand for 
military members’ welfare and benefit keeps growing, investment for military 
modernization becomes more difficult. Therefore, the effort toward a flexible defense 
management system, performance-oriented administration, and management innovation 
to reduce defense budget is imperative. 
From its inception, South Korea’s military was recognized as an organization that 
was based on military-oriented thinking, a leadership grounded in authoritarianism, and 
an inflexible organizational culture. These pre-modern military cultures create many 
reasons for inefficiency and a lower reliance on the military, and have the effect of 
leading the young generation to evade military service. The now open and democratic 
society demands that the military become an advanced organization that can meet its 
various demands.  
C. FOUR KEY POINTS 
In a 2006 defense white paper, the Defense Ministry stated that the goal of 
defense reform is to “build an advanced, elite, and strong force and to work together with 
the people” (Ministry of National Defense, 2006, p. 73). The four focuses were also 
clarified as follows: 
First, the armed forces in South Korea will build their military structure and force 
systems that best fit the characteristics of modern warfare. 
Second, the civilian workforce in the Ministry of National Defense will be 
expanded, while the military will concentrate on the fulfillment of combat missions. 
Third, the defense management system will be innovated to promote information 
and science for the military force in a highly efficient and low cost manner. 
Fourth, the defense system will be transformed into a highly efficient one by 
improving the “barracks culture” and overall national defense. 
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1. Manpower Structure 
When it comes to manpower structure, the military will reduce its present force 
from 680,000 to 500,000 by the year 2020. To meet the designated size, the Army will 
reduce its troops to 371,000, the Navy will be reduced to 64,000, and the size of the Air 
Force will remain the same. Since this troop reduction is designed to build an officer-
oriented structure, the target for personnel reduction will be enlistees. The Defense 
Ministry underlines securing advanced combat capability with the acquisition of state-of-
the-art weapon systems and the establishment of intelligence, surveillance and command 
& control capability.  
The Army’s current 10 corps and 47 divisions will be reduced to 4-6 corps and 
approximately 20 divisions. Military operations performed by large units (e.g., divisions) 
are not regarded as optimal to attain the goals of coping with the current operational 
environment. For these reasons, the U.S. Army reorganized from a division-based to a 
brigade-based force (Johnson, Grissom, & Oliker, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, the U.S. Army 
has streamlined to its current 10 active divisions, down from 18 active divisions in 1991. 
The existing three field commands will be integrated or reorganized into operations 
commands. In other words, the 1st and 3rd Army Commands will become the Ground 
Forces Operations Command and the 2nd Army Command will become the Rear Area 
Operations Command. The subordinate corps commands will also be reorganized to 
simplify the chain of command. By dropping the number of units and shortening the mid-
level of commands, the chain of command will be reduced.  
Though the number of Army corps and divisions will be reduced, it is critical to 
maintain or improve combat capability. To achieve unit reduction and at the same time 
improve combat power, the respective units’ intelligence surveillance capabilities, 
maneuverability and firepower will be enhanced. 
On the way to developing force structure, the Navy and Air Force were somewhat 
alienated. However, the strategic environment on the Korean peninsula, whose three sides 
are surrounded by the sea, makes the role of the Navy and the Air Force more important. 
Compared to neighboring countries, the combat strength of the Navy and Air Force is 
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relatively inferior. The Navy has a plan to reinforce its force structure by reorganizing the 
current three fleets, one submarine flotilla and one aviation flotilla into three fleets, one 
submarine command, one aviation command and one mobile flotilla. By implementing 
this plan, the Navy expects considerable improvement in combat capabilities. By raising 
submarine and aviation units to higher status, the execution of their mission in future 
battlefields will be ensured. In the case of the Marine Corps, it has the battalion-level 
landing operation capabilities only. For that reason, the Marine Corps has a plan to 
expand its landing capabilities to the brigade-level by reinforcing its assets. The Air 
Force currently has only one command, Southern Combat Command. However, it will 
restructure the Air Force operational command system into two combat commands by 
including the newly established Northern Combat Command.   
2. Civilian-led Control System 
To accomplish the national security objectives, it is important to establish civil-
military relations based on the democratic system (Participatory Government Policy 
Report, 2008, p. 59). When it comes to civil-military relations, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (2002) states the purpose clearly in the principles of democracy as follows: 
In democracies, questions of peace and war or other threats to national 
security are the most important issues a society faces, and thus must be 
decided by the people, acting through their elected representatives. A 
democratic military serves its nation rather than leads it. Military leaders 
advise the elected leaders and carry out their decisions. Only those who 
are elected by the people have the authority and the responsibility to 
decide the fate of a nation. (p. xx) If no page number, leave as is. 
South Korea also defines the civil-military relations in its constitution, 
government organization law and military organization law as the U.S. does. The 
fundamental meaning of civil-military relations is also completely the same. However, 
the Defense Ministry headquarters as a central administration organization have long 





can establish and execute the defense policy very hard. Moreover, as the result of a lack 
of interest from the civilian side, a shortage of civilian defense experts contributes to a 
weak civilian base. 
Due to the weak civilian base, the Defense Ministry fills its major positions with 
active-duty officers, which results in several problems. First of all, the military standpoint 
has priority over other points of view. This issue restricts the establishment of national 
security policy connected with the government’s foreign security policy. Second, 
uniformed personnel have a tendency to put emphasis on their own service’s interest. 
Therefore, the ministry has difficulty in balancing each service’s development and 
promoting integrated military strength. The uniformed personnel’s decision-making 
system deepens a resistant atmosphere among the defense organization. Lastly, 
promotion restriction for civil servants who work in the Defense Ministry keeps quality 
civilian members of the workforce from staying in their positions for long periods of time. 
In 2003, the Defense Ministry proposed the need to increase the civilian-led 
control system to the presidential transition team. Since director-level positions were 
occupied by active-duty flag officers who have to move their positions frequently, their 
experience and expertise were hard to apply to the defense policy. Furthermore, flag 
officers in the ministry have their own service backgrounds, which make it hard to 
maintain neutrality when making consistent and objective defense policy. Therefore, the 
necessity for civilianization in the Defense Ministry has gradually increased. 
In the defense reform plan, the civilianization plan consists of three main parts 
(Ministry of National Defense, 2005, p. 26). First, the civil servant ratio in the Defense 
Ministry will be increased from 52% to 71% by 2009.1 To improve newly employed 
members’ expertise, an education program will be established at the National Defense 
University and the number of civilian defense workers who are given the opportunity to 
take part in domestic long-term education and training will be expanded. Second, military 
civilians will be increased from the current 3.9% to 6% of active duty servicemen by 
2020. The current ratio in the defense administration is significantly lower than in other 
                                                 
1 As of December 2005. 
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countries, such as the United States and England (32%), Germany and France (22%) and 
Japan (8%) (Participatory Government Policy Report, p. 73). Since military civilians 
have expertise and continuity in defense administration, it is necessary to increase these 
quotas. Finally, personnel hearings on both the caliber and morality of key military 
appointments will be initiated, which will help the Defense Ministry to improve the 
reliability of its personnel. 
3. Transparent Defense Management System 
Although the defense acquisition plan is vital to secure the national security and 
requires a significant budget, it has failed for a long time to avoid issues of transparency 
and efficiency. There are several reasons for this (Participatory Government Policy 
Report, p. 75). First, overall decision making for the acquisition plans was made by an 
organization that consisted of military personnel only, who raised transparency issues by 
applying excessive security. Second, acquisition processes were very complex and 
internal authorization structures also overlapped unnecessarily. Third, it has been difficult 
for civil servants and uniformed personnel who dealt with acquisition projects to 
accumulate expertise. Fourth, outsourcing was insufficient. Fifth, poor integration of 
management and acquisition plans restricted efforts at analysis and appraisal. Finally, the 
national defense industry and competitiveness for research and development were 
weakened. A protection policy for the defense industry resulted in low efforts to improve 
its competitiveness. Not only that, but most plans for military strength reinforcement 
were import-centered. 
The Defense Ministry is pursuing improvement in transparency, efficiency and 
professionalism in the defense management system. In January 2006, the Defense 
Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) was established. By creating DAPA, the 
aim is to achieve high standards of efficiency by integrating the management of eight 
independent project-related organizations: each service’s project groups, acquisition-
related Joint Chiefs of Staff offices, the defense procurement agency, acquisition-related 
Ministry of National Defense offices, the quality management center, and the agency for 
defense development (Defense White Paper, 2006, p. 27). The mission of DAPA is to 
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contribute to the national interest by pursuing customer-centric defense acquisition 
programs. The commissioner of DAPA stresses that all employees act as role models of 
fair public servants possessed with high ethical standards of self discipline and 
professionalism (Defense Acquisition Program Administration, 2008). 
Personnel management will correspond to the level of the personnel structure of 
advanced nations. Currently, 75% of the entire manpower structure consists of enlisted 
personnel. By decreasing this ratio to 60% by 2020, the military expects improvements in 
the personnel structure and management system. While reducing the total number of 
troops, combat service support and the high technology requirements will be outsourced. 
High-quality combat service support makes it possible for uniformed personnel to 
concentrate on combat and operational missions. In the U.S., the Department of Defense 
increasingly outsources commercial activities to enhance management in conjunction 
with the increase in outsourcing studies on areas such as cost comparison (Robbert, Gates 
& Elliott, 1997, p. 83). The Defense Ministry in South Korea will also perform 
examination on 29 units related to supply, maintenance and welfare of each service. After 
their own innovation efforts, some of the jobs will be outsourced to private companies in 
the civilian sector (Defense White Paper, 2006, p. 29). 
4. Improving Organizational Culture 
Since South Korea uses conscription system to maintain its huge military end-
strength, all young men of a specific age must enlist in the military unless they are not 
eligible for various reasons. However, many people think of compulsory military service 
as a waste of their valuable time and many enlistees just await their discharge from the 
service without objectives. Some young men become draft dodgers and draft resisters 
rather than enlistees. The current military culture has several problems. First of all, 
military culture is very different from its civilian counterpart. The mission has a priority 
over human rights, authoritarianism still exists, and the barracks environment is hard for 
new generations to easily adapt to. Second, there is little effort to ensure sympathy and 
support from the people. People view military society as a narrow, closed one because the 
military does not attempt to open it. Furthermore, improper practices and accidents result 
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in people’s distrust. Finally, fundamental and consistent efforts at reform have fallen 
short. For a long time, the military has had a tendency to focus solely on complementing 
the external system, not making basic changes in members’ awareness, a tendency that 
results from a shortsighted policy that fails to see the inner problems of the barracks.  
The Defense Ministry is attempting to establish a value system. In 2006, it 
established a research center to help uniformed personnel to set correct values 
(Participatory Government Policy Report, p. 110). The objective of the center is to 
investigate the military’s special characteristics, the value difference between 
officers/NCOs and enlistees, changes in the new generation’s psychology and verification 
of behavior. The military expects this center to offer research results to field commanders. 
Moreover, 56,000 Internet PCs will be supplied for self-development for servicemen. The 
technology helps them to study foreign languages and to obtain certificates in line with 
the government’s special law for young people’s employment. By establishing an e-
learning system, enlistees who are temporarily out of school are able to receive credits in 
their military career.  
A legal and systematic basis for guaranteeing human rights will be established. 
The military will recruit civilian specialists to deal with military human rights. The 
current mass barracks life will be modified to a more autonomous one to minimize 
external control and guarantee individual life as much as possible. Since advanced 
leadership starts from selection of excellent cadre, the military will develop scientific and 
objective selection procedures. More officers and NCOs will have advanced leadership 
and respect their subordinates as companions. The current selection system for enlistees 
often fails to screen disqualified individuals, which leads to a huge burden on 
commanders. Therefore, this system will be improved by strengthening humane 
examination and using psychologists as support staff. Through this change, negative 
attitudes toward the military will be reduced, in tandem with a decrease in accidents that 
hinder the organization’s development. 
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Under the National Defense Reform Act, expansion of the civilian base in 
national defense policy making is clearly defined. “Expansion of the civilian base” refers 
to the expansion of civilian participation in the national defense decision-making process 
based upon the principle that the Ministry of National Defense must effectively manage 
and support the Korean Armed Forces by realizing the national defense policy in the 
military aspect, while the specialty and expertise of civilians and military personnel are 
mutually balanced and harmonized (National Defense Reform Act, 2007). When it comes 
to the advancement of the national defense operation system, the Defense Ministry 
clarifies the necessity to expand the use of civilian personnel in order to enhance and 
ensure continuity of the assignment related to national defense.  
Establishing civil-military relations that are compatible with democratic systems 
is crucial to attaining the nation’s security goals while guaranteeing the military’s original 
realm. The civil-military relations represent civilian control, which means a political 
system where a civilian president who is selected by the people, and a civilian Defense 
Minister who is selected by the president, command and control the nation’s military. In 
other words, civilian control means that civilian experts make decisions about national 
defense and undertake the use of military power based upon the nation’s political and 
foreign policy. Although the principles for civilian control are secured by the 
Constitution, the government organization law and the military organization law, active-
duty military personnel have been in the majority in the Headquarters of the Ministry of 
National Defense since the military was established. Military-dominated defense 
management makes it difficult to foster quality civil servants, which leads to low interest 
from civilian candidates. 
The predominance of military personnel in the Defense Ministry headquarters 
creates a problem in keeping defense policy in line with the government’s foreign policy, 
because uniformed workers often give priority to the military’s point of view. Since 
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military personnel have a tendency to consider their own service’s interest, service-
centered thinking becomes an obstruction to developing balanced military structure and 
integrated military power. In addition, the military-centered decision-making system has 
made the organization less flexible. Rigid organization and limited promotion keep 
quality civilian personnel from remaining in their positions longer.  
In January 2003, the office of the President-elect raised a question to consider the 
existing issues in the Defense Ministry while preparing for the transition (Participatory 
Government Policy Report, p. 60). The office pointed out that uniformed personnel do 
not have enough time to manifest their experience and expertise since they switch jobs 
more frequently than civilian staff members.  It also emphasized that quality civilians 
should be appointed to high positions (i.e., directors and section chiefs) to provide 
objectivity, consistency and specialty in defense policy. This strategy did not make steady 
progress at first. Expanding the civilian workforce requires increasing the civil servant 
quota in the Defense Ministry. However, the Ministry of Government Administration and 
Home Affairs (MOGAHA)2 opposed the quota increase for the reason of government 
downsizing. The Defense Ministry kept explaining its plan and the Defense Minister 
agreed to cooperate with the minister of MOGAHA regarding the personnel quota in 
Defense Ministry headquarters. Finally, the Defense Ministry was able to establish 
multiple director offices so that both civilian and military are appointed to the same 
position and to expand civilian working-level positions. 
B. U.S. CIVILIANIZATION PLAN 
In the U.S., the Department of Defense employs more than 700,000 civilian 
personnel in important positions all around the world. Among them, the majority of the 
workforce in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is civilian personnel. In the past, the 
number of civilian personnel was not the same as the current scale. Attempts to substitute 
civilians for uniformed personnel were partially associated with the transition to an all-
volunteer force. Though Congress denied it, the Gates Commission viewed the 
civilianization plan as a method to reduce the demand for new recruits.  At that time, the 
                                                 
2 In 2008, the ministry was renamed the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. 
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expected number of positions that could be civilianized was based on “meeting possible 
accession shortages” for each of the services (Rostker, 2006, p. 199-200). After 
completing transition from conscription to all-volunteer forces in 1973, the transfer of 
positions performed by uniformed personnel to civil service personnel has gone forward 
continuously. According to a defense manpower requirements report by the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the number of civilian 
personnel who work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) keeps increasing 
every year. During FY 2005-2007, the OSD-level civilian ratio ranged from 81 to 82%. 
 
Table 2.   Manpower in Defense-Level Activities and Accounts (After: Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2006) 
FY05 Actual FY06 Estimate FY07 Estimate 
OSD-
Level 
Active Selected Reserve Civilian Total Active 
Selected 
Reserve Civilian Total Active 
Selected 











453 153 1,445 2,051 476 153 1,460 2,089 475 153 1,512 2,140 
 
The Department of Defense maintains or increases its civilian workforce ratio 
because military personnel have frequent rotation of their positions, and civilian workers 
are cheaper sources compared with uniformed personnel. In particular, the DoD asked 
researchers and research institutes to analyze the costs and benefits of substituting 
civilian workforces for military personnel. It considers economical grounds as well as 
other theoretical bases like those of society and the constitution. As part of the efforts to 
foster civilian personnel’s quality and cost effectiveness, it established various programs 
under the Joint Leader Development Division (JLDD), such as the Civilian Education 
and Professional Development (CE&PD) Branch, the Defense Leadership and  
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Management Program (DLAMP), the Defense Senior Leader Development Program 
(DSLDP), the Executive Leadership Development Program (ELDP) and the National 
Security Professional Development (NSPD). 
C. ROK CIVILIANIZATION PLAN 
The plan to increase civilian personnel in the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) began in earnest following the appointment of Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-
Ung in July 2004. He wrote a research paper on civilian control of the military before 
taking office, in which he proposed a “New Paradigm and Tasks for the Defense 
Reform.” In setting forth the defense reform, the Defense Minister was pursuing an 
internal transformation based on the new paradigm in national defense.  He stressed that 
it was important for the MND headquarters to promise a harmonious flow between 
national policy and defense policy. Also, it was necessary to install a civilian-oriented 
administration of MND by successively adjusting the active military ratio. 
 
Table 3.   Manpower in the MND Headquarters before civilianization in 2004 
(After: Participatory Government Policy Report, 2008) 
 Total Active Duty Civilian Note 
Total 856 421 (49%) 435 (51%) 
Director-level 18 10 (55%) 8 (45%) 
Section Chief-level 68 35 (51%) 33 (49%) 
Working-level 770 376 (49%) 394 (51%) 
Exception (179) 
· Administrative Official 
(2) 
· Policy Assistance (3) 
· O-3and below / 
Technical Official (174) 
 
In August 2004, Defense Minister Yoon said that all director-level positions and 
75% of all section chief positions were required to become civilian-filled by the end of 
2006. By doing so, he expected to enhance the ability to mediate between policy and 
national defense, and to adjust conflicts among services. The plan began analyzing 
current active-duty positions to determine whether or not those positions should be 
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managed by uniformed personnel. However, the Defense Minister’s first plan was 
modified slightly due to several constraints. In November 2004, the Defense Ministry 
proposed its headquarters civilianization plan. The main issues and constraints were 
(Planning and Coordination Office, 2007): 
1. Increase civilian workforce ratio to 70% by 2009 
• Maintain active-duty positions requiring military specialty (Policy 
Planning Bureau, Mobilization Planning Bureau) 
• Switch over certain positions that need to understand national policy and 
cooperate with other organization to civilian positions 
• Exchange civilian staff and uniformed personnel in certain director-level 
and section chief positions 
2. Secure quality civil manpower 
• Transfer from active-duty experts to civilian and foster civilian experts 
within the MND 
• Employ quality, new civilian personnel (Civil Service Examination, 
transfer from other organization, special appointment) 
• Use quality reserves and experts 
3. Improve current civilian employees’ expertise 
• Manage personal career: appointment → education → promotion 
• Improve education and training system (short-term and long-term defense-
oriented program development) 
1. Manning Decisions 
It is important to define those positions that could be manned by civilian 
personnel in order to implement the civilian substitution plan. Albro applied seven 
criteria to evaluate the validity of military-civilian substitutions: legal requirements, 
training, discipline, rotation, combat readiness, military background and tradition. He did 
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not consider cost estimation. Instead, he simply assumed that costs of employing civilians 
were less than for military, citing such casual observations as the supposed lower 
turnover rates exhibited by civilian personnel (Albro, 1970, p. 1-20). In 1977, Cooper 
clarified the required factors for manning decisions: military requirements, personnel 
management constraints, cost-effectiveness and tradition. When it comes to manning 
decisions, there are some positions that are intrinsically “military” in nature, just as there 
are some that are intrinsically civilian. Cooper found that the number of such jobs is 
relatively small, probably no more than 25% of the combined present military and 
civilian personnel strengths (Cooper, 1977, p. 291-292). 
The Ministry of National Defense gave guidelines for the selection of positions to 
be manned by military personnel. It separated all positions within headquarters into three 
areas: positions to be manned by military personnel, positions to be manned by civilian 
personnel and positions that can be manned by either. First, military positions are those 
that require active-duty members’ specialties such as military strategy, crisis management, 
military training and field operations. Equal positioning of each service member is also 
required to design a balanced national defense policy. Second, civilian positions are those 
that require full understanding about nationwide policy and cooperation with other 
governmental and civilian organizations. People who work at those positions need to 
develop defense policy from the civilian viewpoint. Some tasks that uniformed personnel 
are unlikely to experience are also required to be operated by civilian personnel. Finally, 
it is possible for some positions in the Defense Ministry to be manned by both military 
personnel and civilian personnel. Although Cooper mentioned that positions with 
intrinsic characteristics were relatively small, the Defense Ministry determined after 







Table 4.   Civilianization Plan in 2005 (After: Planning and Coordination Office, 2007) 
Active Duty → Civilian 
 Civilian (2004) 





Total 374 (52%) 129 32 32 23 21 21 503 (71%)  
Director-Level 6 5 3 2 - - - 11 2006 
Section Chief-
Level 38 10 4 3 3 - - 48 2007 
Working-Level 330 115 25 27 20 21 21 444 2009 
 
In 2007, the Ministry of National Defense asked the Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses (KIDA) to analyze the understanding and improvement of its civilianization 
plan from all levels of society as the plan was being executed. According to the survey, 
both civilian and military personnel had a similar interest in the goal of this plan. 
However, those on active duty showed little sympathy toward the final military-civilian 
ratio in the Defense Ministry Headquarters. Only 27% of all military personnel in the 
organization agreed with this ratio and more than 70% of them answered that this plan 
needed to be adjusted (Dokgo, Cho, Ki, Shin, Kim & Hong, 2007, p. 14). This caused 
discord because the effort to determine those positions that were essential to the military 
was inadequate, since the goal ratio was decided in a top-down manner. Some directors 
and section chiefs do not have military subordinates in their offices though more than half 
of them require military expertise to perform their jobs (Planning and Coordination 
Office, 2007). When the number of positions for civilian personnel increased, the 
complaints from active duty personnel increased. Uniformed individuals thought that 
positions for civilian personnel were relatively influential while their positions were not 
significant. In fact, it is in departments such as the Woman’s Affairs Policy Division 
(50%) and Defense Policy Division (55%) that the majority of members serve on active 
duty. Consequently, the preference of military personnel to work in the Defense Ministry 
has declined and quality military members do not want to make their career in the 
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Defense Ministry. According to a report from the Defense Ministry, 55% of the entire 
active duty personnel in the organization prefer not to work at Ministry positions due to 
future uncertainty, overwork from decrease of military members, and the fact that their 
civilian seniors are often younger than they themselves are.    
2. Securing Quality Civilian Manpower 
The success of the civilianization plan hinges upon hiring and retaining a quality 
civilian workforce. According to the Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan from the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, the 
Department of Defense is well aware of the current difficulties in recruiting and keeping 
its quality civilian members. Accordingly, the DoD sets the vision and the goals, along 
with associated strategies and objectives, as follows (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002, 
p. 6): 
Vision 
• Design, develop and implement HR policies, strategies, systems and tools 
to ensure a mission-ready civilian workforce that is motivated to excel 
Values 
• High personal and professional moral standards 
• Honesty in word and deed 
• Inherent worth and dignity of every person in the workforce 
• Inherent worth of workforce diversity 
• Public service as a valued career 
Principles 
• Support for the warfighters and those who support them 
• Commitment to excellence 
• Best-value HR solutions 
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• Best business practices 
• Flexible, customer-focused HR programs 
• Cost-effective personnel programs 
• Open and honest communication 
• Optimum delegation authority with accountability 
Based on the vision, values and principles above, the Department tried to promote 
its recruiting plan to hire the best quality civilian workers available. This recruiting effort 
includes retired military hires as well as outside hires. To make the Department of 
Defense a premier employer in the Federal Government, the Department built several 
objectives and sub-plans (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002, p. 13-14). It developed a 
recruitment strategy to draw candidates at any level by expanding coverage of 
recruitment, relocation and retention bonuses, identifying incentives and features of 
employment, developing legislative and/or regulatory changes and identifying funding 
sources. 
In Defense Reform Plan 2020, the Defense Ministry made clear that promoting 
the current quality civilian workforce should be the first and employing new members the 
second choice to fill current military positions. To fill its positions with quality members 
from other ministries, a ministry-wide job posting program will be applied. Job posting is 
a competitive recruitment program within the civil service. Civilians are not permitted to 
apply, and the right person for the post is selected from a competition among civil 
servants. The number of posts and agencies participating in this program is increasing 







Table 5.   Numbers of posts and agencies participating in Job Posting Program 
(After: Namkoong, 2007) 
 Before 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2007.5 
Agencies 4 6 8 29 36 - 
Posts 48 5 13 244 460 530 
 
The Defense Ministry developed its human resources management by expertise 
and job characteristics. Using the open position system (OPS) with the civilianization 
plan, the number of civil servants in Grade 5 has increased from 26 (9%) in 2004 to 43 
(14%) in 2007, while the career management system has also improved (Namkoong, 
2003, p. 53-66). Nonetheless, the number of civil servants in Grade 5 is quite small, 
compared to other ministries like the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (81%) and the 
Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (40%). A career management system 
also requires improvement to give more expertise and capabilities to the workforce in the 
Ministry. In response, 77% of working-level employees and 40% of section chiefs stated 
that they did not have prior experience for performing their current tasks (Planning and 
Coordination Office, 2007). This happened because the civilianization plan had 
progressed so promptly without elaborate preparation for fostering quality civilian 
defense specialists. In the U.S., the Defense Department has been successful in hiring 
members who have recently retired from military service with expert organizational, 
managerial and technical qualifications (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002, p. 12). 
Therefore, the Defense Ministry should consider a general plan to employ active duty 
and/or retired people before securing civilian defense experts.  
3. Improving Civil Servants’ Expertise 
In order for civilian personnel to become experts in military organization, they 
should have not only specialized knowledge and skills for doing their jobs, but also 
accumulated knowledge acquired from diverse experience. Currently, there are not 
enough civilian defense experts within the Ministry of Defense. For example, more than 
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60% of the director-general level positions in the Defense Ministry are filled by Army 
generals; clearly, finding skilled civilian substitutes in the short-term is not simple 
(Yong-sup Han, p. 122). The Defense Ministry has built a plan to institute education and 
training programs in many facilities like the National Defense University, not to mention 
the plans to hire relevant civilian experts through outsourcing. 
 
Table 6.   Short career development courses in 2006 (After: Planning and 
Coordination Office, 2007) 
 Institute Course Duration (week) Target Plan Done 
Advanced 






New Appointees 2 Grade 6 & below 12 12 
National Defense 
General Administration 3 Grade 6 2 2 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2  Grade 5 & above 9 9 
National Security Policy 2 Grade 6 & above 10 10 
Organizational 
Manpower 2 
Grade 6 & 
above 5 5 









Logistics School Support and Logistics (4) 2    






Table 7.   Domestic and Foreign Long Career Development Courses in 2006 (After: 
Planning and Coordination Office, 2007) 





Advanced Policy 1 year Director 1 1 
National Security 1 year Director/Section Chief 2 2 
Joint Chiefs of 
































Course 5 months Established Service 5 5 
Foreign Career Development/Degree Course 6 6 
Total 9 Courses 38 38 
 
Traditionally, the quality of Korean public employees has been consistently high 
in most areas due to high competition at the recruiting stage. Education and training, 
however, show serious imperfections and cannot ensure that public servants consistently 
improve their professional competence (Kim & Lee, 2001). In the career development 
courses, however, education and training that are related to national defense policy are 
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relatively insufficient. The Ministry is responsible for designing basic and specialized 
training programs for its own members. Therefore, it should develop a career 
management system that is involved in assignment, education and promotion, establish 
an essential education system by positions and/or stages, and give opportunities to work 
and to study at defense organizations in the developed countries.  
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IV.  COST ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the United States, the substitution of civilian employees for military personnel 
has been viewed as a resource allocation issue. In the 1960s, civilianization was 
considered as a possible solution to skyrocketing manpower costs. Supporters of this 
policy brought significant pressure to bear on the Department of Defense to substitute 
civilians for uniformed personnel wherever possible, resulting in 31,000 military billets 
changing to civilian status during fiscal 1974 (Cooper, 1977, p. 291). The current 
situation remains largely unchanged. The Defense Department still has increasing interest 
in identifying ways to save costs while maintaining and enhancing force effectiveness. 
Extensive research and publications have become the theoretical and practical basis for 
the transfer of military functions to civilian personnel. Civilianization is an often-cited 
way to do this, for two main reasons. First, due to frequent moves, military members 
have a high turnover rate, as well as high training costs. Second, military members cannot 
invest their whole time in office because of their training requirements and other duties 
(Gates & Robbert, 1998, p. 13). 
In South Korea, cost is not considered as a critical factor in military-civilian 
substitution analysis. The Ministry of National Defense only focuses on increasing the 
civilian workforce ratio while keeping and securing quality civilian personnel. Moreover, 
the civilianization plan is subject to modification by the characteristics of each political 
administration. Many people criticized the administration of President Lee Myung-bak 
for systematically reversing the defense policies of his predecessor, President Roh Moo-
hyun, including the civilianization of the Ministry of National Defense (Cho, 2008, p. 
180-199). The conventional assumption has been that civilians are less expensive than 
military personnel, but there has been no actual analysis to determine whether such 
substitutions are actually cost-effective. If it turns out that civilian personnel are cheaper 
than military ones after cost comparison, the Defense Ministry can have another 
 30
justification for the civilianization plan with economic and theoretical support. However, 
the Ministry of National Defense has made no effort to conduct such analysis. 
B. COST ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
It is possible to say that the civilianization of the Department of Defense began 
with the advent of all-volunteer forces in 1973. Manning decisions have been made based 
upon various factors, cost effectiveness among them.3 However, cost was not considered 
an important factor from the beginning. In one of the studies conducted for the Gates 
Commission Albro used seven criteria to assess civilian assumption of military duties: 
legal requirements, training, discipline, rotation, combat readiness, military background, 
and tradition. Instead of mentioning the cost-effectiveness, Albro assumed that civilian 
personnel were less expensive, mentioning such casual observations as the supposed 
lower turnover rates showed by civilian personnel. He recommended that half of the 
approximately 152,000 enlisted billets and 41,000 officer billets could be civilianized out 
of a total military force of about 2.25 million (Albro, 1970, p. 1-20). Taking Albro’s 
recommended substitution, the Gates Commission proposed that 84,000 enlisted billets 
and 23,000 officer billets be converted to civilian ones. Cooper objected to Albro’s idea, 
saying that there was a weakness in his argument, namely, that average turnover rates 
between direct-hire civilians and military personnel were not significantly different 
(Cooper, 1977, p. 291-293). As current budget costs are divided by average personnel 







                                                 
3 To illustrate, Cooper mentioned criteria to evaluate the desirability of military-civilian substitution: 
military requirements, personnel management constraints, cost-effectiveness, and tradition. 
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Table 8.   Average Costs of Military and Civilian Personnel ($ thousands/year) 
(After: Cooper, 1977, p. 297) 
Average Current  
Budget Cost Per Man 





























































































n.a.: data for estimates not available 
 
To meet the demand for a rapid-response manpower cost-estimation capability, 
the Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office produced a series of “Average Cost” 
reports including cost estimates for military and civil service personnel, per man-year by 
pay grade between 1966 and 1980 (Palmer & Osbaldeston, 1988, p. 1-4). However, these 
estimates did not take into account the training costs, which were usually large for 
military personnel, the future retirement benefits and personnel support costs like medical 
support and defense family housing (Palmer & Osbaldeston, 1988, p. 298). For these 
reasons, following studies measured the incremental costs of adding or removing 
personnel from a service branch, as well as analyzing direct labor costs, indirect labor 
costs, and the costs of one-time events (Gates & Robbert, 1998, p. 11). 
1. Costs for Military Personnel 
The two major elements of costs for military personnel are direct costs and 
indirect costs. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, direct costs are 
payments triggered by using personnel in a productivity activity and indirect costs are 
payments for resources used to obtain, train, locate, and support the personnel (Palmer & 
Osbaldeston, 1988, p. 6). Direct costs include basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence 
(BAS), basic allowance for housing (BAH), retirement accrual, employer Social Security 
contributions, and clothing allowance. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of 
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Defense for Personnel and Readiness, basic pay is typically the largest component of 
military pay that all members receive. The amount of basic pay received is determined by 
a member’s rank and years of service.  
The other direct costs serve specific purposes. Basic allowance for subsistence 
(BAS) is intended to cover the costs of a member’s meals. Beginning in January 2002, all 
enlisted members get full BAS, but pay for their meals (including those provided by the 
government) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
n.d.). As of 2009, the monthly BAS rates for officers and enlisted members are $223.04 
and $323.87, respectively.  
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is an allowance to offset the cost of housing 
when military personnel do not live in government-provided housing, and is based on 
geographic duty location, pay grade, and dependency status (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2009).  
Retirement pay is money paid to those members who have completed a full career. 
Military members who remain on active duty for at least 20 years become eligible for 
retirement. Currently, there are three active component retirement systems4: the Final 
Basic Pay System, “High Three” and Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (more 









                                                 
4 Also frequently referred to as regular non-disability retirement. 
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Table 9.   Comparison of Retirement Methods (After: Henning, 2008, p. 6) 
 Final Basic Pay “High Three” Redux 
Applies to Service members  
entering before 
September 8, 1980 
Service members  
entering from  
September 8, 1980 
through July 31, 1986  
and persons entering  
after July 31, 1986  
but opting not to  
accept the 15-year 
Career Status Bonus 
  
Service Members entering 
After July 31, 1986 and 
accepting 15-year Career 
Status Bonus with  




Final rate of 
monthly basic pay 
Average monthly 
basic pay for the 
highest 36 months of  
basic pay 
Average monthly basic pay 
for the highest 36 months 
of basic pay 
Multiplier 2.5% per year of 
service 
2.5% per year of 
service 
2.5% per year of service 
Less 1% for each year of 
service less than 30 
(restored at age 62) 
Cost-of-Living 
Adjustment 
Full CPI Full CPI CPI less 1% with one-time 
catch up at age 62, then 
resumption of CPI less 1% 
Additional Benefit   $30,000 Career Status Bonus 
Payable at the 15-year  
anniversary with assumption 
of  5-year obligation to  
remain on active duty 
 
 Military personnel are not required to contribute a portion of their salary to help 
pay for retirement benefits (Henning, 2008, p. 9). Retired Pay Accrual means that each 










Table 10.   Military Retirement Outlays (billions of current dollars) (After: Henning, 
2008, p. 13) 
 Military Retirement Fund Payments 
to Military Retirees 
DoD Accrual Payments to the 






















 a. FY2008 Budget of the United States Government. Appendix, p. 937. 
 b. FY2006 Budget of the United States Government. Appendix, pp. 953-954. 
 c. FY2005 Budget of the United States Government. Appendix, p. 927. 
 
 According to the DoD Financial Management Regulation, the Federal Insurance 
Contribution Act requires federal agencies to withhold FICA (Social Security and 
Medicare) taxes from the basic pay of military members covered by the Social Security 
Act and to pay matching FICA taxes to the Social Security Administration (SSA) (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2007, p. 45-3). As a federal agency, the 
Department of Defense must pay a FICA tax on wages paid to uniformed personnel.  
Indirect costs include health care costs for active duty and retired personnel and 
their dependents, military recruiting and training costs, and other costs. The military 
health system is a major source of medical care to active duty military personnel, eligible 
military retirees, and eligible dependents of both groups. In the Department of Defense,  
costs of military health care have doubled over the past decade and can be expected to 
reach $64 billion by FY2015 (Best Jr., 2007, p. 3).  
 35
The military gives a compensation package to service members and tries to make 
it competitive with what the civilian sector offers, balancing cash and non-cash benefits. 
The Defense Department offers incentive and/or continuation pay to retain high-quality 
military personnel in critical specialties such as fighter pilots, doctors and nuclear 
engineers. For example, a commissioned officer who completes officer naval nuclear 
power training successfully is eligible to get the Nuclear Career Accession Bonus 
($2,000) as well as the Nuclear Officer Accession Bonus ($15,000). Once he or she 
requests career extension and the Chief of Naval Personnel approves it, the Nuclear 
Officer Continuation Bonus is given, which is $25,000 per contract year (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2007, Ch. 3).  
2. Cost Comparison between Military Personnel and Civilian Personnel 
Contrary to former studies on average costs analysis, recent studies use the 
relative incremental cost to compare costs of military personnel with those of DoD civil 
service personnel. By adding the direct- and indirect-cost factors, the incremental costs 
for military personnel are calculated in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 represents the average 
DoD incremental costs for pay grades O-4 and E-5, while Table 11 shows the relative 











Table 11.   FY96 Incremental Costs ($) for a DoD Average O-4 and E-5 (After: Gates 
& Robbert, 1998, p. 43) 
Components of Military Pay O-4 ($) E-5 ($) 
Direct Costs 
      Basic Pay 
      BAS 
      BAQ 
      VHA 
      Retired Pay Accrual 
      Social Security (FICA) 

















      Active-Duty Health Care Costs 
      Retire Health Care Costs 
      Reenlistment Bonuses 
      Military Recruiting and Training












Total Compensation 92,256 45,668 
 
Table 12.   FY96 Relative Incremental Cost ($) of Military Personnel (After: Gates & 





Warrant Officer Enlisted Personnel 
Grade DoD Avg. ($) Grade 
DoD 
Avg. ($) Grade 
DoD 




















































To compare costs of military and civilian personnel, it is important to consider 
both workforces’ grade. This is because both military and civil service pay and 
compensation are normally based on the grade of the position. There are two approaches 
to doing substitution analysis: traditional approach and alternative approach. The 
traditional approach is to build cost estimates for military and civilian personnel at each 
grade level, then compare both costs at comparable grade levels, as determined by the 
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table of equivalent grades contained in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1000.1, reproduced in 
Table 13. The civil service grades consist of two kinds of salaried workers—Senior 
Executive Service (SES) personnel and General Schedule (GS) personnel. According to 
the Federal Wage System (FWS), there are three kinds of employees: Wage Grade (WG) 
personnel, Wage Leader (WL) personnel, and Wage Supervisor (WS) personnel (Gates & 
Robbert, 1998, p. 8).  
 
Table 13.   General Civil Service and Military Grade Equivalencies (After: Gates & 
Robbert, 1998, p. 43) 
Equivalent Civil Service Grade  
Military 




















































































































The alternative approach is designed to complement the weakness of the 
traditional one. The traditional approach ignores the inflexibility of total military-grade 
structures, which mandate specific proportions of military personnel in each grade. 
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Cutting the military requirement at particular grade levels by substituting civilian 
positions for military ones should be considered. Therefore, Gates and Robbert (1998, p. 
10) set three separate assumptions in this alternative: 
1. The substitution is one-for-one (one civil service worker is replacing one 
military worker) 
2. The civil service grade structure is altered by civilianization (the proportion of 
people at different grade levels changes) 
3. The military grade structure does not change   
 To determine the desirability of a military-civilian conversion, the cost break-
even point was examined to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, as in Table 14. 
 
Table 14.   Cost Break-Even Grades for Military-Civil Service Conversions (After: 
Gates & Robbert, 1998, p. 54) 
Highest Civil Service Grade with Lower Cost per Workyear  
Military 




























































































































Note: This table uses DoD-wide composite military and civil service marginal costs by grade. The civil service grade 
shown is the highest grade that costs the same or less than the corresponding military grade. 
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The researchers found that civilian personnel at certain specific grades are more 
expensive than military personnel. For example, Table 14 shows that GS-14, GS-15, and 
Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel are more costly than all commissioned officers 
up to flag level (O-7 and above), but commissioned officers are more expensive than GS-
13 and below. Therefore, they concluded that civilianization could be a cost-saving 
method, but was not applicable to all cases. 
C. KOREAN CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM 
The Korean civil service system can be characterized as the merit system, the 
rank-oriented classification system, and the centralized management system. The merit 
system represents the recruiting and promoting process for the civil service. Although 
this system was declared in the 1949 National Civil Service Act, it was during the Park 
administration that the merit principle was finally codified in the 1963 National Civil 
Service Act, by officially announcing that “civil servants are employed in accordance 
with exam result, work performance, and actual ability” (Namkoong, 2007, p. 6). As a 
result, the open competitive entrance examination became the common recruiting 
method. Currently, open competitive entrance examinations have three types by grades: 
the Senior Civil Service Examination for Grade 5, the open Competitive Entrance 
Examination for Grade 7, and the Open Competitive Entrance Examination for grade 9. 
The Civil Service Commission in the Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
(MOPAS) administers the examinations, and endeavors to select capable and talented 
individuals as civil servants. Because the Korean people think that the civil service jobs 
are more secure than civilian jobs, all three civil service exams are highly competitive. 
All civil servants are grouped into two major service categories: the special 
category and the general category. The special category includes officials below: 
• Officials who are elected or whose appointment requires the consent of the 
National Assembly 
• Members of the Council of State (Ministers), heads of offices, and Vice-
Ministers, Ambassadors and Ministers in the foreign service 
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• Judges, teachers, secretaries, members of the Armed Forces, and other 
personnel who are designated by law as being in special categories 
• Personnel who are engaged in manual work 
All positions other than the special category positions belong to the general 
category. There is a nine-grade system, with grade 1 being the highest and grade 9 the 
lowest, in the civil service system. This grade system applies to the engineering and 
administrative occupational groups. Although other occupational groups do not match 
completely with the nine-grade system, they usually use a grade-equivalency to define 
their status relative to those in the administrative occupational group. For example, public 
school principals, police chiefs, and O-4 level military are regarded as being equivalent to 
a grade 4 official in the administrative group.  
 
Table 15.   Classification System for General Service (After: Republic of Korea Civil 
Service Commission, 2009) 
Horizontal Classification: 9 Grades 
Senior Civil Service  
(formerly Grade 1-3) 
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6-9 
Secretary-General Director-General Division Director Deputy Director Officer 
Vertical Classification: 18 Occupational Groups → 75 Occupational Series →  
141 Occupational Sub-Series 
 
The civil service system was the closed career system, which meant that the 
middle rank positions were not open to outside candidates and the hierarchical system 
was characterized as seniority-based personnel management with lifetime employment 
guaranteed. While filling manpower vacancies at the grade 9 by recruiting new 
candidates, vacancies at the grade 5 and 7 were filled by promotions and transfers from 
other positions as well as by new recruitment. Although promotions were made either by 
competitive examination or by performance evaluation of employees, seniority was the 
key for promotion. Currently, the Promotion Review Committee determines promotion 
by selecting candidates based on job performance, skills, career history, specializations, 
ethics, and aptitude, which makes seniority less decisive. 
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The Participatory Government tried to revise the closed career system by opening 
the door of civil service to attract more competent people from inside and outside 
government. As a result, the Open Position System (OPS), the leave of absence for 
private work program, and the Senior Civil Service (SCS) Program came into effect. The 
open position system is a way to attract talented experts from both the public and private 
sectors through diversifying hiring methods for the civil service. Table 15 shows the prior 
positions of appointees under the open position system in May 2007. Outside 
appointments were almost half of total positions of the open position system (48.9% ). 
The personnel exchange program was introduced to build competitiveness in the civil 
service by strengthening close interagency cooperation and fostering quality civil 
servants. Middle managers become participants of the leave of absence for private work 
program, which has a two-year term of exchange and which expects to bring close 
cooperation between the sectors. 
 
Table 16.   Prior Positions of OPS appointees as of May 2007 (After: Namkoong, 
2007, p. 14) 
Outside of the Ministry 







Subtotal Civilian Other Ministry 
Total 219 33 186    (100%) 











175 32 143   (100%) 











44 1 43     (100%) 






2     
(4.6%) 
 
Although there have been many efforts to create a more flexible and decentralized 
personnel management system, the civil service system of Korea is still centralized. The 
Central Personnel Agency (CPA) of Korea has been changed several times since the 
establishment of the Korean Government in 1948. In 1948, personnel administration was 
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managed by the Personnel Bureau within the Ministry of Government Administration 
(MOGA) under the Office of the Prime Minister. Competitive and noncompetitive 
recruitment was separately managed by the Recruitment Examination Commission 
(REC) under the Office of the President. From February 1955, when the prime ministerial 
system was abolished and the State Council Secretariat was established, personnel 
management functions were executed by the Administrative Bureau of the State Council 
Secretariat. From May 1963, the Ministry of Government Administration (MOGA) took 
charge of personnel administration functions. With the government restructuring of 
February 28, 1998, MOGA was combined with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to 
make the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA). In 
2008, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) was established by 
integrating MOGAHA, the Civil Service Commission, the National Emergency Planning 
Commission, and the national informatization strategy functions of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication. Consequently, personnel functions were performed by 
MOPAS. 
The personnel management functions were centralized from the start and were not 
changed even though the Central Personnel Agency was changed many times. During the 
authoritarian regimes (1961–1992), the centralized personnel management system was 
reinforced even more. The CPA managed all civil service entrance examinations and got 
involved in the process of promotions within the government as a whole. The CPA 
administered not only personnel management functions of the central government but 
also, to a certain extent, those of local governments. It is true that centralized personnel 
management has some advantages, such as improving standardization, efficiency, and 
specialized counseling. However, it also has disadvantages like administration delay and 
inflexibility. The current administration is trying to bring autonomy and decentralization, 
so that all members of its workforce can do their best while increasing the government’s 
capability at the same time.  
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D. COST ANALYSIS IN KOREA 
1. Pay System for Civil Servants 
The pay for civil service personnel is determined by such factors as the standard 
cost of living and the relative pay for comparable jobs in the private sector. The civil 
servants’ pay consists of a basic salary, allowances and welfare expenses. The basic 
salary is the major component of the pay of civil service personnel. Grade and length of 
service are significant determinants of basic pay. There are pay-step schedules by job 
categories, with each schedule differing from the others. The concept of step is similar to 
years of service to a certain extent. However, it is different from years of service because 
if a civil servant had other careers relative to a particular position before, extra pay-steps 
might be given to him/her. Table 17 shows the pay-step conversion rate of previous 
careers. 
 
Table 17.   Illustrative conversion rates of previous careers (After: Republic of Korea 
Civil Service Commission, 2009) 
Previous Career Conversion Rate 
Government Officer Career  
Military Service Career 
100% 
Career worked as a doctor, pharmacist or nurse 
Career worked in the training or research institutions 
Career worked as a journalist or reporter 
80% 
Career worked in the international organizations 
Career worked in the public enterprises 
Career worked as teachers in private schools 
70% 
 
When one civil service member is promoted, his/her next pay-step is determined 
by the following conversion table (Table 18). For example, when he/she is promoted 
from step 21 of Grade 5, his/her new pay-step will be step 19 of Grade 4. The pay-step 
conversion for promotion is shown in Table 18. 
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Table 18.   The Pay-Step Conversion (After: Republic of Korea Civil Service 
Commission, 2009) 
Pay-step before promotion New pay-step at the promoted position 
Step 1 Step 1 
Step 2 1 pay-step reduced 
Step 21-32 2 pay-steps reduced 
 
The allowances and welfare expenses are an additional remuneration that is paid 
separately based on the position, dependents, and living location of individuals. There are 
43 kinds of allowances and 6 kinds of welfare expenses in the civil service pay system. 
 
Table 19.   Allowances and Welfare expenses in Korean Civil Service (After: 
Republic of Korea Civil Service Commission, 2009) 
Bonus(3) 
Diligence allowance (0-50% of basic pay) 
Seniority allowance (50,000-130,000won) 
Performance bonus (Grade 4 and below) 
Family support 
(4) 
Family support allowance (20,000won per 
dependent, 30,000won for spouse, up to four 
dependents) 
Allowance for children’s educational expenditures 
Housing allowance (Middle & High School expenses) 
Baby care leave allowance (500,000won) 
Hardship post 
allowance 




Hard risk allowance (40,000-50,000won) 
Special task allowance (28) 





Overview work allowance 
Midnight work allowance 
Holiday work allowance 
Managerial allowance (Grade 4 and above) 
Welfare 
expenses (6) 
Household support payments (16.7% of basic pay) 
Meal payments (130,000won) 
Grade payment (70,000-150,000won) 
Commutation payment (120,000-200,000won) 
Traditional holiday’s bonus (60% of basic pay, twice a year) 
Non-vacation payment (Grade 1 and below, within 20 days) 
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In Korea, the public pension scheme for military personnel is not significantly 
different from that for government employees. Although the public pension system for 
military personnel is managed by the Ministry of National Defense, the major schemes 
are identical to the Government Employees’ Pension. Military personnel or civilian 
personnel who have served more than 20 years are eligible for pensions. Pension rates 
range from 50% (minimum 20 years) to 76% (maximum 33 years) of the final three-year 
average salary. Unlike the United States, Korean military personnel contribute a certain 
portion of their pay to their future pensions. The contribution rates for the pension system 
for civil service employees as well as military personnel are currently set at 17%, with the 
government and the personnel sharing the expense equally.  
2. Cost Comparison between Military and Civilian Personnel 
In Korea, the major factor in deciding to use military or civilian personnel is 
military requirement, not cost estimation. Moreover, civilianization plans tend to be 
controlled by political interest. Most people just assume that military personnel cost more 
than civilian personnel without deeply analyzing costs. As a matter of fact, the pay and 
compensation scheme, as well as the pension plan, for military personnel is not 
significantly different from its civilian equivalent. However, the basic pay schedule 
varies according to the occupational groups in the civil service. There are 12 basic salary 
schedules in the civil service pay scheme. Pay schedules for military and civilian 
personnel are given in Appendices A and B. 
To compare cost, it is important to identify the comparable grade levels between 
military and civilian personnel in the Defense Ministry. According to the Civil Service 
Classification System, director level positions are manned by O-8 (Major General and 
Rear Admiral (upper half)) and Grade 2/3. Section-chief level positions are filled with O-
6 (Colonel and Captain for Navy) and Grade 3/4. O-5 and Grade 4/5 are assigned to 
working level positions. However, direct cost comparison is not simple because the 
amount of basic pay is determined by grade and pay-step. In addition, the civilian pay 
schedule is more complex than the military’s because there are various ways to become a 
civil servant. For example, when one person passes the Senior Civil Service Examination 
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for Grade 5, he becomes Grade 5 with pay-step 1. However, another person who passed 
the open Competitive Entrance Examination for grade 7 and was promoted to Grade 5 
would have a higher pay-step than direct Grade 5 appointees. The number of current 
section-chief and working-level civilian positions (Grade 3, 4 and 5) is as follows. Due to 
the difficulty of acquiring exact data, the following numbers are not accurate, but are 
close to the real values (Table 20). 
 
Table 20.   Number, Pay-step, Basic Pay of Civilian Personnel (Grades 3, 4 and 5) 





Senior Civil Service 
Examination 
2 20 3,340,000 
Grade 3 
(10) Open Competitive 
Entrance 
8 27 3,585,200 
Senior Civil Service 
Examination 




(40) Open Competitive 
Entrance 
30 23 3,095,500 
Senior Civil Service 
Examination 
5 9 2,286,400 
Grade 4 
(40) Open Competitive 
Entrance 
35 20 2,978,900 
Senior Civil Service 
Examination 




(180) Open Competitive 
Entrance 
135 16 2,483,500 
 
 47
When it comes to section-chief positions, Grade 3 personnel who passed Senior 
Civil Service Examination have an average of pay-step 20, which makes their basic pay 
3,340,200 won. O-6 level military personnel who receive more basic pay are those who 
have pay-step 12 and above. Grade 3 personnel from Open Competitive Entrance 
Examination earn an average of 3,585,200 won as basic pay. Only O-6 who earn at pay-
step 15 are more expensive than them.  By applying the same technique, it is possible to 
save costs when Grade 4 personnel from Senior Civil Service Examination (2,596,400 
won) and Open Competitive Entrance (3,095,500 won)—with pay-step 4 and above and 
pay-step 10 and above, respectively—substitute for O-6 level military positions.  
In the case of working-level positions, Grade 4 from Open Competitive Entrance 
is the most expensive source. The amount of basic pay is 2,978,900 won, which is more 
expensive than O-5 with pay-step 10 and below. The next most expensive source is as 
costly as O-5 with pay-step 5. Therefore, substituting civilian personnel other than Grade 
4 from Open Competitive Entrance for O-5 level positions offers more potential for cost 
savings. 
Considering the substitution matter as a whole, the most cost-saving method is for 
the Defense Ministry to select and make the best use of talented civilian personnel from 
the Senior Civil Service Examination pool. Moreover, those individuals can stay and 
work at the organization longer, since they enter the Ministry when they are relatively 
young. The Senior Civil Service Examination is the most difficult civil service recruiting 
test, which makes those who have passed the exam more competitive and competent. 
However, it takes time for them to acquire job skills comparable to those of current 
military personnel. 
Although the pay and compensation schemes of military and civilian personnel 
are similar, training and recruiting costs for military personnel make them more 
expensive. In the Republic of Korea, there are three primary sources of officer 
commissioning: the Academies (Army, Navy and Air Force), the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS).  When looking into the 
monetary investment in each program, the officer commissioning cost is seen to be 
considerable, especially for academy graduates. On the other hand, civilian personnel 
 48
enter the Government organizations without going through such programs. Although 
some of them take orientation courses, the costs of such courses are not comparable with 
program costs for officers. 
 
Table 21.   Officer Commissioning Program Investment (After: Over 200 million won 
per cadet in military academies, 2008) 
Program Service Investment (won) 
Army 210 million 
Navy 200 million Academy 
Air Force 220 million 
 
Army Academy at 
Yeongcheon5 
59 million 
ROTC All 2-year scholarships 
Army 10 million 
Navy 8 million 
Air Force 6 million 
OCS 
Marine 4 million 
 
3. Summary 
Military personnel have special allowances that civilian personnel cannot receive, 
such as overseas tour pay, hardship-duty pay, submarine-duty pay, flight pay, diving pay, 
and so on. However, military personnel who are working at the Defense Ministry are not 
able to receive those additions. The military pay schedule is one part of the larger civil 
service pay scheme, with military basic pay constituting the primary difference from 
other civil services. Basic pay for military personnel is slightly higher than that for 
                                                 
5 The Korean Army Academy at Yeongcheon (KAAY) is a two-year commissioning program, 
formerly the Korean Third Military Academy. The four-year Army officer commissioning school is the 
Korean Military Academy (KMA), which is located in Seoul. 
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civilian personnel with equivalent time of service. And recruiting and training costs make 
military personnel more expensive. However, there are talented military personnel who 
have working experience at the Defense Ministry, which means that they are more 
productive. The Defense Ministry does not have feasible career plan for military 
personnel who lose their positions due to civilian substitution, which makes them have a 
negative view on the substitution plan. Although the Defense Ministry makes an effort to 
ensure the quality and productivity of education and professional development activities 
for civilian personnel, it takes time to get the expected outcome since the effort is in an 
early stage. 
Substituting civilians for military personnel does not correspond to direct 
retirement of military members. Since the Armed Forces maintain a force sufficient to 
perform their capabilities, most military personnel who worked at the Defense Ministry 
go back to field units and each service’s headquarters. That means that although the 
Defense Ministry might save its budget through the civilian substitution, the Government 
will have more budgetary burden due to new civilian recruits’ increase. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Ministry of National Defense developed Defense Reform Plan 2020 with a 
comprehensive and long-term vision. To make a “smaller but stronger” force suitable for 
future warfare, four main policies were developed: downsizing and reorganizing the force 
structure, increasing the civilian workforce ratio in the Defense Ministry, strengthening 
the system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and securing defense budgets to support the 
defense reform. Among these initiatives, progress in civilianizing the Defense Ministry 
has been faltering due in part to the control exercised by political interests and therefore 
has been unable to gain the approval of all members in the Defense Ministry. 
Establishing national defense under civilian control is important because it is 
compatible with democratic systems under the Constitution. However, for a long time, 
active-duty military personnel have formed a majority in the Defense Ministry 
Headquarters, which has been problematic in keeping defense policy in line with the 
national policies in areas such as foreign affairs and reunification. By setting a specific 
civilian workforce ratio (71%) by 2009, the Defense Ministry is now beginning to 
implement a civilian control system in the organization. 
In the United States, the Department of Defense faced a similar challenge of 
substituting civilians for military personnel after the transition to an all-volunteer force. 
While pursuing civilianization in the Defense sector, the Defense Department examined 
the characteristics of all positions and asked researchers and research institutes to analyze 
the costs and effectiveness of the policy. Many research papers give practical and 
theoretical support to the Defense Department by evaluating the desirability of civil-
military substitution.  Cost estimation technique has been well developed with support 
from the Department of Defense. The Defense Department continues to develop a 
civilian management plan that enhances the quality of civilian members within the 
organization.  
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In Korea, the Ministry of National Defense has also tried to inspect its members’ 
response to the civilianization plan. However, the survey results from the Korea Institute 
for Defense Analyses (KIDA) showed that there were some discrepancies among 
members. Although most members agreed with the goal of the plan - a more rational 
defense management system through expansion of civilian-led policy decision-making -  
there were differing views on the final civilian-military ratio. The reasons were that the 
goal ratio (71%) was decided by top officials and members were not prepared sufficiently 
to accept the sudden changes. The Defense Ministry is well aware of the importance of 
securing quality civilian manpower and improving the expertise of current civilian 
personnel. Hiring knowledgeable personnel is applicable to a variety of areas, such as the 
Job Posting Program and Career Management System. The Defense Ministry also 
developed short and long career development courses to enhance the expertise of current 
civilian personnel. Because these plans have only recently been developed, it will take 
some time for the results to become apparent; therefore, the process of increasing the 
civilian personnel ratio is too hasty. 
When it comes to cost comparison between military and civilian personnel, direct 
comparison is limited because grade and pay-step are not fixed to a certain position. 
Moreover, there are different methods of entrance to service, which makes civilian 
personnel’s pay-steps too diverse. In general, military personnel are more expensive 
sources than civilian personnel, even though cost difference varies with grade and pay-
step. However, the savings are not considerable because basic pay is the main difference 
between the military and civilian pay system.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. How Would the Civilianization of Military Positions Support the 
Defense Ministry’s Reform Objectives? 
There are expected benefits from expanding the civilian-led foundation of 
national defense. The Ministry of National Defense can establish an advanced defense 
management system corresponding to the democratic constitution and process. In a 
democratic society, the military should follow the orders of the elected political 
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leadership. By expanding the number of civilian personnel and enhancing their 
competencies, they can make and implement defense policy effectively. Since civilian 
personnel can stay longer than military personnel, quality and consistency of defense 
policies can be expected. This makes the Defense Ministry more expertise-oriented, more 
flexible and more acceptable of political advice. In this way, military personnel can 
concentrate on accomplishment of their combat missions.  
2. What Factors are Considered in the Examination of Converting 
Military Jobs to Civilian Ones? 
Several factors can be considered when making the manning decision to convert 
military positions to civilian ones. The most important thing to be considered is which 
positions are military essential. The Ministry of National Defense also gave guidelines 
for certain positions to be manned by military personnel. In addition to military 
requirements, personnel management constraints, cost-effectiveness and tradition can be 
examined. The Defense Ministry should consider how to manage outgoing military 
members’ careers and institute a career development program. Cost estimation will give 
an economic basis for substituting civilian personnel for military personnel. This 
economic basis can be developed further by analyzing the effectiveness of both military 
and civilian personnel. 
3. How Does the Civilianization Process Differ between the Republic of 
Korea Ministry of National Defense (ROK MND) and the United 
States Department of Defense (US DoD)? 
Currently, the Department of Defense employs more than 700,000 civilians in an 
array of critical positions worldwide; over 81% of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
are civilian personnel. The Defense Department builds the human resource strategic plan 
and promotes focused, well-funded recruiting to hire the best talent available (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2002, p. 8). This recruiting effort includes retired military hires 




programs, and mentoring are considered to recruit and hire candidates. Rotational 
assignments, developmental flexibilities, and educational opportunities are efforts to 
promote members’ expertise and retention. 
The civilianization process of the Republic of Korea is not significantly different 
from that of the United States. Most civilian billets in the Ministry of National Defense 
are filled by the merit principle, the competitive recruitment examination. In the process 
of civilianization, the Defense Ministry tries to attract more competent people using the 
open positioning system, personnel exchange program and special appointment. 
However, the effort to use talented military personnel is relatively low. Military 
personnel with expertise do not require training and education for newcomers. It is not 
recommended to let outgoing military members leave the organization. Therefore, the 
Defense Ministry should take measures to make the best use of current and outgoing 
military personnel with expertise. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Timetable for the Civilianization Plan’s Implementation Should 
be Extended until More Civilian Defense Experts are Developed 
From its foundation, the Defense Ministry has been staffed by a majority of 
military members and military personnel, who preferred to work at the Defense Ministry 
due to career development and location advantage. While the number of military 
personnel who have experience working at the Defense Ministry is relatively large, there 
is an insufficient number of talented civilian defense experts. In general, longer-serving 
managers run organizations well because they have the relevant job skills and knowledge 
to accomplish tasks. Moreover, they know how to foster good communication among 
work units. Once talented civilian defense experts are cultivated and they enter the 
Defense Ministry, it becomes a more consistent and effective organization. This is 
because civilian personnel do not have to rotate frequently through positions. Therefore, 
the Defense Ministry should foster civilian defense experts first before promoting the 
civilianization plan. 
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2. The Defense Ministry Must Develop a Plan to Fill Positions with 
Members Who have Recently Retired from Military Service, and Who 
Possess the Requisite Expertise 
Military personnel rotate frequently through positions every two to three years, 
while civilian personnel stay in the organization. The military members’ frequent moves 
give them a broad spectrum of experience they can apply to various tasks. However, 
military personnel have difficulty in maintaining the expertise required in the policy 
centered organization. In spite of that, the relatively large number of military personnel 
who have experience at the Defense Ministry should not be overlooked. In the United 
States, the Defense Department makes an effort to hire members who have recently 
retired from service, and who possess the required expertise. This allows the Department 
of Defense to establish defense policies that are linked with the individual military 
organizations’ realities and capabilities. It is military members who have a thorough 
knowledge of military organization. Therefore, the Defense Ministry must build a plan to 
use active-duty members and recent retirees with expert knowledge. 
3. The Defense Ministry and Research Organizations Should Consider 
the Economic Aspects of the Civilianization Plan 
One important thing that should not be overlooked while promoting a policy is 
money. The Ministry of National Defense’s projected budget requirement for defense 
reform totals some 621 trillion won between 2006 and 2020 (Bennett, 2006, p. 2). 
Considering that the 2009 state budget in the Republic of Korea is 284 trillion won, the 
amount needed for defense reform is not trivial. For that reason, all defense reform 
policies should be implemented in a cost-effective way. The civilianization plan is one of 
the main policies of the defense reform. Therefore, the Defense Ministry and research 
organization must consider thoroughly the cost-effectiveness of the main policies.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further studies must refine a way of estimating both military and civilian 
personnel cost. Therefore, it is necessary to make personnel data more quantitative. In 
addition, there should be an effort to monetize productivity of military and civilian 
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personnel. Although no direct solution to monetizing productivity exists, there are 
possible components for benefit calculation, such as decreased errors/reject rate and 
higher retention rate. The sociological and psychological effects of civilian substitution 
could be evaluated from retention intentions. As mentioned earlier, analyses of the 
process and outcomes for civilianization have so far focused predominantly on political 
interests. Therefore, understanding social and psychological effects as well as economic 
outcomes can help decision makers and manpower planners to make better manning 
decisions. 
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APPENDIX A.  OFFICER BASIC PAY SCHEDULE (2009) 
               Rank 
Pay Step 
O-8 O-7 O-6 O-5 O-4 O-3 O-2 O-1 
1 3,184,200 2,997,900 2,414,000 2,138,700 1,743,500 1,379,800 1,060,700 961,600 
2 3,265,600 3,077,500 2,498,700 2,223,400 1,826,500 1,457,800 1,126,300 1,023,900 
3 3,347,000 3,157,100 2,583,400 2,308,100 1,909,500 1,535,800 1,191,900 1,086,200 
4 3,428,400 3,236,700 2,668,100 2,392,800 1,992,500 1,613,800 1,257,500  
5 3,509,800 3,316,300 2,572,800 2,477,500 2,075,500 1,691,800 1,323,100  
6 3,591,200 3,395,900 2,837,500 2,562,200 2,158,500 1,769,800 1,388,700  
7 3,672,600 3,475,500 2,922,200 2,646,900 2,241,500 1,847,800 1,454,300  
8 3,754,000 3,555,100 3,006,900 2,731,600 2,324,500 1,925,800   
9 3,835,400 3,634,700 3,091,600 2,816,300 2,407,500 2,003,800   
10 3,916,800 3,714,300 3,176,300 2,901,000 2,490,500 2,081,800   
11 3,998,200 3,793,900 3,261,000 2,985,000 2,573,500 2,159,800   
12 4,079,600 3,873,500 3,345,700 3,070,400 2,656,500 2,237,800   
13 4,161,000 3,953,100 3,430,400 3,155,100 2,739,500    
14   3,515,100 3,239,800 2,822,500    
15   3,599,800 3,324,500     
* Unit: South Korean Won (KRW) 
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APPENDIX B.  CIVILIAN BASIC PAY SCHEDULE (2009) 
       Grade 
Pay Step 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 2,381,100 2,126,200 1,901,000 1,656,800 1,453,000 1,186,100 1,052,700 935,100 820,100 
2 2,473,200 2,213,800 1,979,900 1,731,300 1,518,200 1,247,700 1,107,100 986,600 868,400 
3 2,567,900 2,302,600 2,061,100 1,807,000 1,585,800 1,311,500 1,164,600 1,041,000 919,600 
4 2,664,700 2,392,800 2,143,300 1,884,700 1,656,200 1,376,800 1,225,200 1,096,400 973,900 
5 2,764,000 2,484,000 2,226,700 1,963,500 1,728,700 1,444,000 1,287,900 1,154,400 1,028,900 
6 2,864,700 2,575,700 2,311,300 2,043,200 1,802,700 1,513,300 1,352,300 1,213,700 1,085,200 
7 2,967,000 2,668,600 2,396,900 2,123,800 1,878,000 1,582,700 1,417,400 1,273,500 1,139,200 
8 3,070,500 2,761,800 2,482,800 2,205,000 1,954,400 1,652,600 1,482,800 1,330,900 1,191,400 
9 3,175,300 2,855,500 2,569,600 2,286,400 2,031,000 1,722,900 1,545,200 1,385,900 1,241,600 
10 3,281,000 2,949,600 2,656,600 2,368,100 2,108,400 1,789,000 1,605,000 1,438,200 1,289,900 
11 3,386,800 3,044,100 2,743,800 2,450,500 2,180,800 1,851,900 1,661,600 1,488,800 1,336,200 
12 3,492,700 3,138,800 2,831,500 2,525,900 2,248,700 1,912,000 1,715,600 1,537,000 1,380,900 
13 3,599,200 3,234,100 2,913,000 2,596,400 2,313,200 1,968,600 1,766,900 1,583,300 1,423,600 
14 3,706,000 3,320,200 2,988,600 2,662,200 2,373,300 2,022,100 1,816,000 1,627,400 1,465,200 
15 3,799,200 3,399,900 3,058,200 2,724,100 2,430,100 2,073,400 1,862,700 1,669,800 1,505,000 
16 3,882,100 3,472,800 3,123,300 2,782,400 2,483,500 2,121,500 1,907,100 1,710,700 1,543,600 
17 3,955,500 3,539,900 3,183,600 2,836,600 2,533,800 2,167,400 1,949,700 1,749,000 1,581,100 
18 4,021,000 3,601,200 3,239,700 2,887,400 2,581,400 2,210,900 1,990,300 1,786,100 1,616,200 
19 4,079,500 3,657,800 3,291,800 2,934,700 2,626,000 2,252,000 2,028,500 1,821,700 1,650,500 
20 4,132,200 3,709,600 3,340,200 2,978,900 2,667,800 2,290,800 2,065,000 1,855,600 1,683,400 
21 4,180,500 3,756,700 3,385,200 3,020,300 2,707,300 2,328,000 2,099,800 1,888,100 1,714,300 
22 4,223,700 3,800,200 3,426,900 3,059,000 2,744,400 2,363,000 2,132,700 1,919,200 1,744,100 
23 4,260,000 3,839,900 3,465,400 3,095,500 2,779,400 2,395,900 2,164,500 1,948,900 1,772,300 
24  3,872,200 3,501,300 3,129,600 2,812,000 2,427,400 2,194,700 1,977,500 1,799,600 
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25  3,903,200 3,531,000 3,161,000 2,842,800 2,457,200 2,223,100 2,004,500 1,825,400 
26   3,558,900 3,187,700 2,871,900 2,485,400 2,250,500 2,030,800 1,848,900 
27   3,585,200 3,212,200 2,896,100 2,512,100 2,273,700 2,052,800 1,869,100 
28    3,235,600 2,919,300 2,534,500 2,295,300 2,073,900 1,888,500 
29     2,940,600 2,555,600 2,316,200 2,093,900 1,907,400 
30     2,961,300 2,576,200 2,336,000 2,113,300 1,925,500 
31      2,595,300 2,354,800 2,132,000 1,943,500 
32      2,613,600    
* Unit: South Korean Won (KRW) 
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